

**SECURE WIRELESS LAN DEVICE INCLUDING  
TAMPER RESISTANT FEATURE AND ASSOCIATED METHOD**

**Field of the Invention**

The present invention relates to the field of communications and computers, and, more particularly, to a secure wireless local area network (LAN) and 5 associated methods.

**Background of the Invention**

Computers are often connected together as part of a Local Area Network (LAN). The LAN permits computers to share data and programs with one another.

10 Many typical LANs are based upon physical connections between individual computers and a server, for example. The connections may be twisted pair conductors, coaxial cables, or optical fibers, for example.

There is also another class of LAN based upon 15 wireless communication to the individual computers. A wireless LAN is not restricted to having physical connections to the individual computers. Accordingly, original installation may be simplified. Additionally, one or more of the computers may be used in a mobile 20 fashion. In other words, the user may use a laptop computer and move from place to place while still being connected via the wireless LAN.

In particular, the IEEE standard 802.11 is directed to a wireless LAN. The IEEE 802.11 standard defines the protocol for several types of networks including ad-hoc and client/server networks. An ad-hoc network 5 is a simple network where communications are established between multiple stations in a given coverage area without the use of an access point or server. The standard provides methods for arbitrating requests to use the medium to ensure that throughput is 10 maximized for all of the users in the base service set.

The client/server network uses an access point that controls the allocation of transmit time for all stations and allows mobile stations to roam from one access point to another. The access point is used 15 to handle traffic from the mobile radio to the wired or wireless backbone of the client/server network. This arrangement allows for point coordination of all of the stations in the basic service area and ensures proper handling of the data traffic. The access point routes 20 data between the stations and other wired/wireless stations or to and from the network server.

Of course, two or more LANs may be interconnected using wireless LAN devices at respective access points. This may be considered a network bridge 25 application.

Security is addressed in the 802.11 standard as an option and may be accomplished by an encryption technique known as the Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) algorithm. This algorithm is based on protecting the 30 transmitted data over the radio transmission using a 64-bit seed key and the RC4 encryption algorithm. WEP, however, only protects the data packet information and does not protect the physical layer header. This is so that other stations on the network can listen to the 35 control data needed to manage the network.

Unfortunately, this may provide a reduced level of security.

To provide higher levels of security, more powerful cryptographic equipment is available, such as  
5 a TACLANE KG-175. This equipment provides confidentiality and end-to-end authentication to protect sensitive information. Unfortunately, for a wireless LAN, such a device is relatively bulky and expensive.

10 Also, the WEP algorithm and the key may be readily determined upon obtaining possession of a LAN device and downloading the security associated memory contents, for example. Once the key is determined, the communications is no longer secure.

15 Summary of the Invention

In view of the foregoing background, it is therefore an object of the invention to provide a secure wireless LAN device that provides greater security, and yet without a significant increase in  
20 cost and/or complexity.

This and other objects, in accordance with the invention are provided by a secure wireless LAN device which in one embodiment includes a housing, a wireless transceiver carried by the housing, and a  
25 cryptography circuit carried by the housing. More particularly, the cryptography circuit may operate using cryptography information and may also render unuseable the cryptography information based upon tampering. Accordingly, one obtaining possession of  
30 the device cannot readily determine the cryptography information needed to intercept communications. Of course, the secure wireless LAN device may be used with other LAN devices, such as user stations and/or access

points, in any of a number of different LAN configurations.

The cryptography circuit may comprise at least one volatile memory for storing the cryptography information, and a battery for maintaining the cryptography information in the at least one volatile memory. Accordingly, the cryptography circuit may further include at least one switch operatively connected to the housing for disconnecting the battery from the at least one volatile memory so that the cryptography information therein is lost based upon breach of the housing. The switch may be provided by one or more switch clips and associated circuitry.

The cryptographic information may comprise a cryptography key and/or at least a portion of a cryptography algorithm. This cryptographic information remains relatively secure and is lost upon tampering, such as removing the housing.

The secure wireless LAN device may also include a media access controller (MAC), and the MAC may implement a predetermined wireless LAN MAC protocol. For example, the predetermined wireless LAN MAC protocol may be based upon the IEEE 802.11 standard.

The secure wireless LAN device may also comprise at least one connector carried by the housing for connecting to at least one of a user station and an access point. For example, the at least one connector may be a PCMCIA connector.

The cryptography circuit may comprise a cryptography processor, and a control and gateway circuit connecting the cryptography processor to the MAC and the wireless transceiver. The wireless transceiver may comprise a baseband processor, a modem connected to the baseband processor, and a radio

frequency transmitter and receiver connected to the modem. In addition, the secure wireless LAN device may also include at least one antenna carried by the housing and connected to the wireless transceiver.

5           A method aspect of the invention is for making tamper resistant a secure wireless LAN device comprising a housing, a wireless transceiver carried by the housing and a cryptography circuit carried by the housing. The method may include storing cryptography  
10 information in the cryptography circuit, and rendering unuseable the cryptography information based upon tampering with the secure wireless LAN device. The cryptography circuit may comprise at least one volatile memory for storing the cryptography information, and a  
15 battery for maintaining the cryptography information in the at least one volatile memory. In this embodiment, rendering unuseable comprises disconnecting the battery from the at least one volatile memory based upon a breach of the housing.

20           **Brief Description of the Drawings**

FIG. 1 is a perspective view of the secure wireless LAN device in accordance with the invention.

FIG. 2 is a perspective view of a laptop computer including the secure wireless LAN device as shown in  
25 FIG. 1.

FIG. 3 is a perspective view of a LAN access point device including the secure wireless LAN device as shown in FIG. 1.

FIG. 4 is a schematic diagram of an ad-hoc LAN  
30 using the secure wireless LAN devices as shown in FIG. 1.

FIG. 5 is a schematic diagram of an infrastructure LAN using the secure wireless LAN devices as shown in FIG. 1.

FIG. 6 is a schematic diagram of a network bridge LAN configuration using the secure wireless LAN devices as shown in FIG. 1.

FIG. 7 is a schematic block diagram of the secure  
5 wireless LAN device as shown in FIG. 1.

FIG. 8 is a chart of the data unit protocol for  
the secure wireless LAN device as shown in FIG. 1.

FIG. 9 is a more detailed schematic block diagram  
of the secure wireless LAN device as shown in FIG. 1  
10 and illustrating the cryptographic traffic path.

FIG. 10 is a more detailed schematic block diagram  
of the secure wireless LAN device as shown in FIG. 1  
and illustrating the key fill and algorithm download  
connectors.

15 FIG. 11 is a more detailed schematic block diagram  
of the secure wireless LAN device as shown in FIG. 1  
and illustrating the data bus protection.

FIG. 12 is a schematic transverse cross-sectional  
view of the secure wireless LAN device as shown in FIG.  
20 1.

FIG. 13 is a schematic longitudinal cross-  
sectional view of a portion of the secure wireless LAN  
device as shown in FIG. 1.

**Detailed Description of the Preferred Embodiments**

25 The present invention will now be described more  
fully hereinafter with reference to the accompanying  
drawings, in which preferred embodiments of the  
invention are shown. This invention may, however, be  
embodied in many different forms and should not be  
30 construed as limited to the embodiments set forth  
herein. Rather, these embodiments are provided so that  
this disclosure will be thorough and complete, and will  
fully convey the scope of the invention to those

skilled in the art. Like numbers refer to like elements throughout.

Referring initially to FIGS. 1-6, the secure wireless LAN device **20** and its use in various LAN configurations are first described. The device **20** is illustratively in the form of a PC-card, such as an extended Type 2 PC-card. The device **20** includes a housing **21** which carries a connector **27** at one end, and a pair of antennas **22** at the opposite end.

For example, the housing **21** may have a length of about 5.75 inches, which is slightly longer than typical PC-cards. This extended length may serve to accommodate additional cryptography circuitry as will be described in greater detail below. The housing **21** may also have a width of about 2.1 inches, and thickness of about 0.2 inches. Of course, other dimensions are also contemplated by the invention.

The interface connector **27** may be a PCMCIA connector or other similar connector that can readily interface to a number of possible LAN devices as will be appreciated by those skilled in the art. For example, as shown in FIG. 2, the secure wireless LAN device **20** may be received in a corresponding PC-card slot in the side of a laptop computer **25**. The device **20** may also be received in a PC-card slot of an access point **30** as shown in FIG. 3.

As shown in FIG. 4, a plurality of user stations **25** may be connected in an ad-hoc LAN configuration **35** where each station can communicate with every other station using the secure wireless LAN devices **20**. Unencrypted data called "plain text" is generated at the station **25** and encrypted data called "cipher text" is sent over the radio frequency (RF) links between the secure wireless LAN devices **20**.

An infrastructure LAN configuration **40** is shown in FIG. 5. In this LAN configuration **40**, each user station **25** communicates with the access point **30** via respective secure wireless LAN devices **20**. In 5 addition, in the illustrated LAN configuration **40**, the access point **30** is also connected to a conventional wired LAN. Cryptography may be optionally applied to the communications over the wired LAN using a conventional cryptography device **41** as will be 10 appreciated by those skilled in the art.

A network bridge LAN system **45** is illustrated in FIG. 6. This configuration or system **45** provides for communications between access points **30** of different LANs. The secure wireless LAN devices **20** are used to 15 provide the secure RF links between the access points **30**. Cryptography devices **41** may be optionally used on the wired connections to the access points as shown in the illustrated LAN system **45**.

Turning now to FIGS. 7 and 8 the secure wireless 20 LAN device **20** is now described in greater detail. The device **20** includes a wireless transceiver **50**, a medium access controller (MAC) **60** and its associated memory **61**, and a cryptography circuit **70**. Each of these circuit portions are carried by or contained within the 25 housing **21** (FIG. 1).

In accordance with one aspect of the invention, the cryptography circuit **70** may encrypt both address and data information for transmission, and decrypt both address and data information upon reception. A higher 30 level of security is thus provided. The cryptography circuit **70** may implement a cryptographic algorithm and use a cryptographic key to provide a predetermined security level. For example, the cryptography circuit

**70** may use an algorithm and key to provide Type 1 security. Lower levels of security, such as DES and triple DES, may also be implemented as will be readily appreciated by those skilled in the art.

5       The MAC **60** may implement a predetermined wireless LAN MAC protocol. In one preferred embodiment, the LAN MAC protocol may be based upon the IEEE 802.11 standard. The MAC **60** may be a model HFA3841 MAC chip available from INTERSIL of Melbourne, Florida. Other 10 similar MACs may also be used. The model HFA3841 is a chip from among a chipset offered by INTERSIL as part of its PRISM® 2.4 Ghz WLAN chip set. Further details of the HFA3841 are available in the data sheet for this part dated January 2000, file number 4661.2, the entire 15 disclosure of which is incorporated herein by reference.

The wireless transceiver **50** may include a baseband processor **51**, a modem **52** connected to the baseband processor, and a radio frequency transmitter and 20 receiver connected to the modem. The RF transmitter and receiver are provided in the illustrated embodiment by the RF/IF converter **53**, the power amplifier **54** connected to the transmit output, and the pair of switches **55, 56** connected to the antennas **22**.

25       The baseband processor **51** may be a model HFA3863 Direct Sequence Spread Spectrum Baseband Processor also available from INTERSIL. The baseband processor **51** provides the functions needed for a full or half-duplex packet baseband transceiver. Further details of the 30 HFA3863 are available in the data sheet for this part dated May 2000, file number 4856.1, the entire disclosure of which is incorporated herein by reference.

The modem **52** may be a model HFA3783 part also offered by INTERSIL which is a fully differential SiGe baseband converter for half-duplex wireless applications. It features the necessary circuitry for 5 quadrature modulation and demodulation of "I" and "Q" baseband signals and includes the required synthesizer as will be appreciated by those skilled in the art. Further details of the HFA3783 are available in the data sheet for this part dated November 2000, file 10 number 4633.3, the entire disclosure of which is incorporated herein by reference.

The RF/IF converter and synthesizer **53** may be provided by an INTERSIL part number HFA3683A. This part is a SiGe half-duplex RF/IF transceiver for 15 operation at the 2.4 Ghz ISM band. The HFA3683A is further described in the data sheet for this part dated September 2000, file number 4634.6, the entire disclosure of which is incorporated herein by reference.

20 The power amplifier **54** may be a model MA02303GJ available from M/A-COM. The power amplifier circuit **54** may also include an external detector so that an accurate automatic level control can be implemented. The MA02303GJ is further described in the data sheet 25 for this part, the entire disclosure of which is incorporated herein by reference.

In addition to the INTERSIL and M/A-COM components described herein, other similar components may also be used from other manufacturers. Representative other 30 products/manufacturers include the AirConnect® product of 3COM, and the Spectrum24® product from SYMBOL, for example.

The cryptography circuit **70** also includes a cryptography processor **72** and serial-to-parallel

converter (CPLD) **71** connected to the MAC **60** and the cryptography processor. A control and gateway block **73** is provided as part of the field programmable gate array (FPGA) **74**. A FIFO **75** is also illustratively 5 connected to the FPGA **74**.

As seen in the lower portion of FIG. 7, the MAC **60** generates a payload **80** including a header **81**, the data **82**, and a CRC code **83**. This payload **80** is combined with the cryptography generated bits **85** and the 10 baseband processor generated bits **84** in the illustrated embodiment.

Referring now additionally to FIG. 8, exemplary data structures are further described. The upper portion of FIG. 8 sets forth the MAC protocol data unit 15 **90**. Of interest, addresses 1-4 may be provided as indicated with reference numerals **91-94**. The lower portion of FIG. 8 illustrates the baseband output in greater detail, showing the physical layer convergence protocol (PLCP) frame format **100**. These various data 20 structures or formats are exemplary only and will be appreciated by those of skill in the art without further discussion. Of course, other formats may also be used as will also be appreciated by those skilled in the art.

25 As will be appreciated by those skilled in the art, the cryptography processor **72** may add a plurality of encrypting bits **85** to be transmitted over an extended time, for example, as compared to the IEEE 802.11 standard. Accordingly, the control and gateway 30 circuit **73** may control the transmitter to operate for this extended time. For example, the transmitter may be readied earlier and operate slightly longer than would otherwise be the case without the cryptography features of the present invention. Other schemes for

handling the slightly longer data packets are also contemplated by the present invention.

Referring now additionally to FIG. 9, additional portions of the secure wireless LAN device **20** are now described. The cryptography circuit **70** may be provided, for example, by a SIERRA™ cryptographic module available from Harris Corporation of Melbourne, Florida which is also the assignee of the present invention. The cryptography processor **72** may be a Palisades ASIC, for example, as in the SIERRA™ cryptographic module. The cryptography circuit **70** also includes a RAM and associated back-up battery **105** as will be discussed in greater detail below. The FPGA **74** may be programmed to produce the various devices and logic blocks as shown in FIG. 9 as will be appreciated by those skilled in the art.

As explained with additional reference to FIG. 10, the secure wireless LAN device **20** may include a fifteen-pin connector **110** carried by the housing and used to interface to external circuitry **111** as will be appreciated by those skilled in the art. The external circuitry **111** may include download terminal interface circuitry **111a** to permit the cryptographic algorithm, or at least portions thereof, to be loaded. In addition, the external circuitry **111** may include fill device interface circuitry **111b** to provide the key fill to the cryptography processor **72**. In other embodiments, different interfaces may be used for these features as will be appreciated by those skilled in the art.

The illustrated embodiment also includes an undervoltage, overvoltage, tamper, and zeroize circuit block **106** connected to the cryptography processor **72** and to the RAM **107**. The secure wireless LAN device **20**

may have its key changed periodically as required, and may also have the cryptography algorithm updated or changed as well to provide further flexibility and security.

5       Turning now to FIG. 11, the cryptography circuit 70 may also comprise a protection circuit 114 to protect against transmission of unencrypted data. The protection circuit 114 may be provided by logic gates 115, 116 and input registers 117 implemented within the  
10      FPGA 74 as will be appreciated by those skilled in the art. This protection circuit 114, along with similar protection circuitry within the CPLD 71, provides redundancy so that plain text is not accidentally transmitted from the secure wireless LAN device 20.  
15      Also shown in the illustrated embodiment are FLASH 108 and RAM 107 to be used by the cryptography processor 72.

One method aspect of the invention is for providing a secure wireless LAN system, such as the LAN configurations or systems 35, 40 and 45 shown respectively in FIGS. 4-6, for example. The method may include equipping a plurality of LAN devices with respective secure wireless LAN devices 20 as described herein. In particular, the method may further include providing a cryptography circuit 70 carried by the housing and cooperating with the MAC 60 and the wireless transceiver 50 for encrypting both address and data information for transmission, and for decrypting both address and data information upon reception.

30      Yet other important features of the secure wireless LAN device 20 are now described with additional reference to FIGS. 12 and 13. The device 20 illustratively includes a two-part housing 21 provided by a metal top and bottom 21a, 21b which clip or engage

together along opposing longitudinal side edges. The housing **21**, in turn, carries a printed wiring board **118**. The printed wiring board **118** may carry the MAC, cryptography circuit, and wireless transceiver as discussed extensively above. In addition, other circuitry and devices may also be provided in the housing **21** as schematically indicated in FIG. 13 as components **125**. These components **125** may be carried by both sides of the printed wiring board **118**, and the printed wiring board maybe a multilayer wiring board as will be appreciated by those skilled in the art.

Labels **126** may be carried in respective recesses formed in the housing **21** as shown in FIG. 13.

The printed wiring board **118** also illustratively carries an indicator LED **119** and a zeroize switch or circuit **120** as shown in FIG. 12. Ground clips **122** tie the housing bottom **21b** to an electrical ground on the printed wiring board **118**. In addition, tamper switch clips **123** engage the upper housing portion or top **21a** in the illustrated embodiment. The volatile memory or RAM **107** and back-up battery **109** are also schematically illustrated as being carried by the printed wiring board **118**.

The secure wireless LAN device **20** includes the cryptography circuit **70** described herein that operates using cryptography information. In accordance with this aspect of the invention, the cryptography circuit also renders unuseable the cryptography information based upon tampering. In other terms, the cryptography circuit **70** may comprise at least one volatile memory **107** for storing the cryptography information, and a battery **109** for maintaining the cryptography information in the at least one volatile memory.

Accordingly, the cryptography circuit may further include at least one switch, such as the illustrated tamper clips **123** operatively connected to the housing **21**, and to associated circuitry, for disconnecting the 5 battery **109** from the at least one volatile memory **107** so that the cryptography information therein is lost based upon breach of the housing.

As will be appreciated by those skilled in the art, the cryptographic information may comprise a 10 cryptography key and/or at least a portion of a cryptography algorithm as discussed in detail above. This cryptographic information remains relatively secure and is lost upon tampering, such as removing or breaching the housing **21**.

15 Another method aspect of the invention is for making tamper resistant a secure wireless LAN device **20** comprising a housing **21**, a wireless transceiver **50** carried by the housing and a cryptography circuit **70** carried by the housing. The method may include storing 20 cryptography information in the cryptography circuit **70**, and rendering unuseable the cryptography information based upon tampering with the secure wireless LAN device. The cryptography circuit **70** may comprise at least one volatile memory **107** for storing 25 the cryptography information, and a battery **109** for maintaining the cryptography information in the at least one volatile memory. In this embodiment, rendering unuseable comprises disconnecting the battery from the at least one volatile memory based upon a 30 breach of the housing. Of course, other schemes for rendering the cryptography information unuseable are also contemplated by the present invention.

Other aspects of the secure wireless LAN device **20** are described in copending patent application entitled

"SECURE WIRELESS LAN DEVICE AND ASSOCIATED METHODS",  
serial no. \_\_\_\_\_, attorney work docket no.  
51188, which is also assigned to the present assignee.  
The entire disclosure of this application is  
5 incorporated herein by reference. In addition, many  
modifications and other embodiments of the invention  
will come to the mind of one skilled in the art having  
the benefit of the teachings presented in the foregoing  
descriptions and the associated drawings. Therefore,  
10 it is understood that the invention is not to be  
limited to the specific embodiments disclosed, and that  
modifications and embodiments are intended to be  
included within the scope of the appended claims.